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The Antitrust Expediting Act-A Critical Reappraisal
"I venture to predict that a critical reappraisal of the problem would lead to the
conclusion that 'expedition' and also, over-all, more satisfactory appellate review
would be achieved in these [antitrust] cases were primary appellate jurisdiction
returned to the Court of Appeals . .• .''l

The Expediting Act2 has been subject to some rather severe criticism from the bench and bar. At the extreme, it has been suggested
that the act be repealed and the procedure for appealing government civil antitrust cases be completely overhauled. 3 Even proponents
of the act have acknowledged its need of revision,4 but there is little
agreement among them on the extent and nature of desirable
change. This comment will explore the origins, development, and
current role of the Expediting Act in order to help determine what
course revision, if it is needed, should follow.
Section I of the act5 provides that in any civil antitrust suit
brought under the Sherman Act6 or any later-enacted statute having
a like purpose in which the United States is plaintiff, the Attorney
General may, if he considers the case to be of "general public importance," require the suit to be heard before a district court constituted of three judges. The three judges so designated assume the
duty "to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date
... and to cause the case to be in every way expedited." Regardless
of whether the section I procedure for convening a three-judge court
is employed, section 27 of the Expediting Act provides that, in every
government civil antitrust suit, an appeal from the final judgment
of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court. The act not
only precludes an appeal to the court of appejlls, but also, since
appeal lies only from the final judgment of the district court, it effectively precludes the possibility of an interlocutory appeal to either
the court of appeals or the Supreme Court.8
I. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (1962) (separate opinion).
2. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § I, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 28, 29
(1958) [referred to herein as the "act"].
3. See, e.g., Gesell, A Much Needed Reform-Repeal the Expediting Act for Antitrust Cases, 1961 N.Y. S.B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMPOSIUM 98.
4. See, e.g., Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Negative View, 1961 N.Y.
S.B.A• .ANTITRUST L. SYMPOSIUM 94.
5. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § I, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1958).
The act also provides identical treatment for government civil cases arising under the
Interstate Commerce Act. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ I, 8, 12, 13, 19 (1958). However, this latter aspect of the Expediting Act is
beyond the scope of this comment. Discussion will be limited to the procedural
expedition of antitrust suits.
6. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
7. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958).
This section also applies to government civil cases arising under the Interstate Commerce Act. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ I, 8, 12,
13, 19 (1958). See note 5 supra.
8. See United States v. California Co-op. Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 558 (1929).
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I. BIRTH OF THE EXPEDITING Acr
When the Expediting Act was adopted in 1903, it introduced the
seventh class of cases in which appeal would lie directly to the Supreme Court from the decision of a single district court judge.9 Its
raison d'etre, of course, was to speed up litigation of certain government suits. Why it was thought necessary to expedite government
antitrust suits, and to do so by circumventing completely the circuit
courts of appeals, can be partially explained by an examination of
the legislative history and the historical setting in which the statute
was framed.
At the tum of the century the ten-year-old Sherman Act10 was
considered by many to be a dead letter. 11 It was not being actively
enforced, and mammoth trusts were abounding as a result of an
apparent immunity created by the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 12 However, the Northern Securities case, 13 brought in 1902 by the Roosevelt Administration, signalled the beginning of a government crusade to challenge growing
economic power concentrated in a few hands. It became apparent that the Sherman Act was to be given meaning and that
the suits to be brought under it, such as Northern Securities, 14 would
9. Under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat.
826, appeals could be taken directly to the Supreme Court from •the district court in
the following situations:
"In any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue; in such cases
the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the Supreme Court from
the court below for decision.
"From the final sentences and decrees in prize causes.
"In cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime.
"In any case that involves the construction or application of the Constitution
of the United States.
"In any case in which the constitutionality of any law of the United States,
or the validity or construction of any treaty made under its authority, is drawn
in ~uestion.
• In any case in which the constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in
contravention of the Constitution of the United States."
10. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-6, 8, 26 Stat. 209-10, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1958).
11. See 2 SULLIVAN, OUR TIMES 412-19 (1927).
12. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The Knight case held in effect that the Sherman Act did
not extend to restraints of trade affecting merely the manufacture of commodities.
13. United States v. Northern Sec. Co., 120 Fed. 721 (D. Minn. 1903), affd, 193 U.S.
197 (1904). For a discussion of the history behind this litigation, see 2 SULLIVAN, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 412-19.
14. The Northern Securities Company was a holding company which had been
formed to acquire the controlling interest in two competing railroads, the Great
Northern and Northern Pacific Railway companies. The issue in the Northern
Securities case was whether the Supreme Court would bring the numerous trusts which
had been created as holding companies under the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.
The question, however, was not simply the method by which the government would
control the trusts, but more fundamentally whether the government had the power
to control them at all. This issue was recognized as one that would vitally affect
the economic structure of the nation. The uncertainty created by the government's
challenge of the holding company device in Northern Securities caused the market
for American securities to become demoralized throughout the world. Consequently,
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raise novel and important issues of governmental regulation of business. Thus, it was deemed necessary to provide a procedure by which
government antitrust cases could be expeditiously appealed to the
highest court for a final determination. It was hoped that the act, in
addition to assuring early consideration of vital economic issues, 15
would contribute to a uniform development of the Sherman Act. 16
In 1903 the circuit courts of appeals had been in existence only
twelve years. 17 Prior to 1891, the Supreme Court had been vested
with exclusive jurisdiction over all federal appellate claims.18 Since
the courts of appeals were relatively new, they were not readily
trusted to handle appeals of cases which previously would have
gone straight to the Supreme Court.19 These new intermediate
courts of appeals would have to overcome "a deep professional feeling against taking away from litigants the right to resort to the Supreme Court for vindication of their federal claims."20 In spite of
the creation of the courts of appeals, it was thought necessary to preserve litigants' rights to seek review in the Supreme Court directly
from 'the district courts in a substantial number of cases,21 particularly those of extreme national importance.22 Government antitrust
cases of the period were considered by many to be of such importance.23
Moreover, in 1903 the opportunity for appellate delay was great.
Before the Expediting Act, cases arising under the Sherman Act
were appealed to the circuit court of appeals. 24 Six months were allowed for taking the appeal, and one year was allowed for taking an
appeal from the court of appeals to the Supreme Court.25 There was
the early resolution of this issue was of paramount importance. See 2 SULLIVAN, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 412-19, 462-67; 1 SWAIN, THE CRAVATH FIRM 707-15 (1946).
15. Senator Fairbanks, then chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
stated in presenting the bill on the Senate floor: "[I]t is the purpose of the bill to
expedite litigation of great and general importance." 36 CONG, R.Ec. 1679 (1903).
(Emphasis added.)
.
16. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (1962) (separate opinion);
FRANKFURTER &: LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPRDtE COURT 263 (1928); 109 CONG,
R.Ec. 11911 (1963) (remarks of Senator Johnston).
17. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See FRANKFURTER &: LANDIS, op. dt.
supra note 16, at 257.
18. Id. at 258.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. See note 9 supra.
22. See 36 CoNG. REc. 1679 (1903) (remarks of Senator Fairbanks).
23. The attorney general stated in a letter to the House Committee on the
Judiciary that he considered the type of case which would be directly reviewable
under the Expediting Act to be of as great an importance as any of the then existing
classes of cases directly reviewable. H.R. REP. No. 3020, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1903).
See note 9 supra.
24. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, §§ 6, 11, 26 Stat. 826, 828, 829.
25. Ibid. Interestingly enough, however, the first case tried under the Sherman Act,
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), was decided in the Supreme
Court within one year of the district court's decision.
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the further possibility of a party's taking an interlocutory appeal to
the court of appeals from a decision of a district court granting or
denying an interlocutory injunction.26 These combined factors
raised the fear that trusts and large business organizations would
utilize the existing appellate procedure to tie up complex antitrust
cases in the courts for indefinite periods.27 Consequently, the Expediting Act limited the taking of appeals to final judgments of the
district court and required the appeal to be taken directly to the
Supreme Court within sixty days of the district court's decision. 28
In addition to cutting out one step in the normal appellate procedure, the act thus sought to facilitate the ultimate disposition of
antitrust cases by reducing the possibility for delaying tactics on the
part of the litigants.29
Unlike the direct appeals procedure, the provision in section 1
of the Expediting Act, providing for the invocation of a three-judge
district court by the Attorney General, had no legislative precedent.30 Apparently Congress felt that occasionally antitrust cases
would involve matters too complex and important to be considered
by a single judge, and that the Attorney General was in the best
position to recognize such a case. 31 Three judges would insure that
the case would receive "as full consideration before presentation to
the Supreme Court as if heard by the United States circuit court of
appeals." 32 Section I of the Expediting Act was first utilized in the
crucial Northern Securities case,33 which followed enactment of the
Expediting Act by slightly less than two months.34 If the juxtaposi26. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 660. See United States v. California Co-op.
Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 558 (1929).
27. See Solomon, supra note 4, at 96.
28. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823. The time within which to take
an appeal under the Expediting Act, which is still sixty days, is now governed by 28
U.S.C. § 210l(b) (1958).
29. Why the act was limited in its antitrust aspects to civil government suits is
not entirely clear. A reasonable hypothesis is that private and criminal actions were
not envisaged as the vehicles by which the more important antitrust issues were likely
to be raised. Indeed, as subsequent litigation has borne out, not nearly as many
private treble damage actions or criminal prosecutions have caused an impact on
antitrust law as have government civil suits. Criminal suits are usually brought in areas
where antitrust law is more settled because of the higher burden of proof required;
and many private actions are instituted in the wake of successful government suits
which have already settled the major issues.
30. See HART 8: WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 47-48
(1953).
31. Ibid. Actually, the original Expediting Act did not limit the hearing to three
judges. It provided that the case must be heard by "not less than three" judges. Act
of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823.
32. H.R. REP. No. 3020, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1903). This view is interesting in
light of the attitude of some toward the role of the court of appeals at that time. See
note 19 supra and accompanying text.
33. United States v. Northern Sec. Co., 120 Fed. 721 (D. Minn. 1903), afj'd, 193 U.S.
197 (1904). See note 14 supra.
34. The Expediting Act was enacted on February 11, 1903, and the decision of the
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tion of these two events was not accidental, then it would seem that
Northern Securities exemplifies the type of case Congress meant section 1 to cover.

II. THE CuRRENT RoLE OF THE Acr
A. The Provision for Direct Appeals
In contrast to the situation in 1903, appeals may now be taken
directly to the Supreme Court from the decision of a single district
court judge in only three classes of cases: from a decision holding
an act of Congress unconstitutional; 35 from certain decisions adverse
to the United States in criminal cases; 36 and from decisions falling
within the Expediting Act. In all other direct appeals statutes, review
is restricted to decisions by district courts constituted of three
judges.37 Antitrust cases falling within the Expediting Act now provide the major source of direct appeals to the Supreme Court.
In a recent ten-year period, about thirty-seven civil antitrust
cases were instituted on the average by the government each year,88
compared to one case in 1903.89 It is doubtful whether each of the
thirty-seven cases today raises issues of equal importance to that
raised by the one case of 1903. Indeed, it has been argued that there
is currently relatively little development of substantive antitrust
district court (then called the circuit court) in Northern Securities was rendered on
April 9, 1903.
35. 28 u.s.c. § 1252 (1958).
36. 18 u.s.c. § 3731 (1958).
37. 28 u.s.c. § 1253 (1958). See ROBERTSON & KmKHAM, JURISDICI10N OF nm SUPREME
COURT OF nm UNITED STATES § 167 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951). The three-judge
court is little used under the Expediting Act today. See notes 66-76 infra and accompanying text.
38. Antitrust cases commenced during fiscal years 1954-1963:

Government Cases
Civil
Criminal

Fiscal Year

Total

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

194
258
281
244
325
315
315
441
2,079
457

21
33
30
38
33

4,909

Private Cases
Electrical
equipment
industry
Othex

41
52

10
16
24
18
22
42
27
21
33
25

37
1,739
97

163
209
227
188
270
250
228
341
266
283

373

238

1,873

2,425

23
60

42

DIRECTOR OF TiiE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TiiE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 139 (1963);
DIRECTOR OF TiiE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 118 (1960).
39. 109 CONG. REc. 11912 (1963).
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law; rather, the issue raised on appeal is usually whether the
district court's decision is supported by the facts in the record. 40
In addition, many appeals merely involve procedural matters. For example, in the relatively recent case of United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co.,41 the question on appeal under the act was whether the
defendant could compel the government to produce minutes in a
grand jury transcript which government attorneys were using to prepare for trial in the civil action. More generally, when a district court
denies a motion to intervene in a government civil antitrust case, an
appeal lies only to the Supreme Court after the final judgment of the
district court,42 even if the appellant's sole ground of appeal is that he
was wrongfully denied permission to intervene.43 Such issues hardly
seem to involve matters of general public importance within the
spirit of the Expediting Act.
It is clear that the courts of appeals have established themselves
as fully competent to handle most appeals. 44 And, for the most part,
the opportunity for appellate delay which existed in 1903 has been
abolished. Today only two months is allowed for taking an appeal
to the court of appeals (one month for private cases),45 and only
three months is allowed for taking an appeal from the court of appeals to the Supreme Court.46 Although an interlocutory appeal may
easily be taken from a decision granting or denying an interlocutory
injunction;n in all other cases a litigant must satisfy both the district judge and the court of appeals that an interlocutory appeal
"may materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation.'' 48
It has been suggested that the heavy work-load of the Supreme
Court, combined with the voluminous record compiled in most antitrust cases, tends to slow down consideration of antitrust cases ap40. See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); United States v.
Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
41. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
42. ROBERTSON &: KIRKHAM, op cit. supra note 37, § 171.
43. Ibid.
44. See FRANKFURTER &: LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 258. In fact some Supreme
Court Justices have lamented that the act deprives them of the valuable assistance of
an intermediate appellate review. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174,
175 n.l, 202 (1963) (Clark and Harlan, JJ.); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 355 (1962) (concurring opinion of Clark, J.).
45. 28 u.s.c. § 2107 (1958).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 210l(c) (1958). There is the possibility of obtaining an extension of
another twe months. Ibid.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1958).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958). Interestingly, the Senate Report on § 1292(b) cited an
antitrust action as one in which an interlocutory appeal might well speed up the ultimate determination of the case. S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958). For
example, a motion that the statute of limitations had run might be denied in the
district court. On appeal from the district court's final judgment, the court of appeals
might decide that the statute had run and that the district court did not, consequently,
have jurisdiction over the action.
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pealed under the act to the extent that the cases are not really expedited.49 However, a comparison of government civil cases taken
directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act with private
treble damage cases which were processed through the court of appeals
to the Supreme Court, as well as Federal Trade Commission antitrust
cases similarly processed, shows that the act does in fact expedite. 50 On
the average, it takes an antitrust case approximately an extra year
to go through the court of appeals. Moreover, it takes the court
of appeals approximately the same length of time to decide a
private appeal as it does the Supreme Court to decide a direct government civil appeal, 51 even though many courts of appeals allegedly
enjoy a lighter work-load than that of the Supreme Court and government cases are usually more complex than the typical private case.52
Thus, the litigants, if they are required to take their cases initially to
the court of appeals, will wait as long to secure that one appellate review as if the case were taken directly before the Supreme Court, and
the court of appeals order may then be appealed, bringing further
delay and expense. The cost of a single appeal in either case will,
presumably, be substantially the same.
An important consideration in evaluating the merit of the direct
appeals provision is the extent to which it imposes a work burden
on the Supreme Court. As previously stated, appeals may be taken
directly to the Supreme Court from the decision of a single district
court judge in only three classes of cases. The class involving appeals
from decisions holding an act of Congress unconstitutional53 has
not proved to be a fertile source of direct Supreme Court appeals, 54
nor has the second class, involving certain types of district court decisions adverse to the United States in criminal cases.55 However,
under the Expediting Act, the Supreme Court heard thirty-one antitrust cases during a ten-year period ending in 1963.56 This was
slightly more than one-half of all the antitrust cases heard during
that period. 57 In addition, this was at a time when the number of
cases filed in the Supreme Court each year appeared to be increas49. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (1962) (separate opinion).
50. See Appendix.
51. Ibid.
52. During fiscal year 1949 five government civil antitrust cases consumed 19, 22,
38, 42, and 65 trial days respectively; while four private antitrust cases consumed 12,
13, 13 and 24 days respectively. These days exclude time spent in informal conferences
and other preliminary matters. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON
PROCEDURE IN ANTITRUSf AND OTIIER PROTRACTED CAsES 4-5 (1951).
"
53. See Frankfurter &: Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October
Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HA.Rv. L. REv. 577, 610-19 (1938).
54. During the nvelve years following its enactment, only about ten appeals
were taken under its provisions. See ROBERTSON &: KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 37,
§ 115 n.3.
55. Id. § 176.
56. See Appendix.
57. Ibid.
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ing;li 8 several Justices have complained that direct appeals were imposing a "great burden" on the Court.59 Since the Court generally
believes that a party is entitled to at least one appellate review, it
seems to be more inclined to note probable jurisdiction in cases arising directly under the Expediting Act. 60 In addition, appeals from
decrees or orders made in the district court after the final judgment
run directly to the Supreme Court,61 and, consequently, there is the
possibility of dual appeals: once from the final judgment, and once
from any decree modifying that judgment.
It would be conjectural to estimate how many fewer government
antitrust cases the Supreme Court might have to consider if there
were no direct appeal provision. But if an intermediate appeal were
required, grant of review in the Court would more likely depend
on a conflict in the circuits or other traditional grounds, rather than
on the basis that a party is entitled to at least one review. The number of cases heard by the Court under the act in the past ten years
is small, averaging only three per year. 62 Whether a review by the
court of appeals in that small number of cases which now come directly before the Supreme Court would significantly lessen the
Court's overall work-load is open to question. 63 The court of appeals
cannot institute a trial de novo, and it is equally bound by rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.64 It has been suggested, however, that after one appeal, attention in the Supreme
58. The following table shows the number of cases filed, disposed of, and remaining
on the dockets in the Supreme Court of the United States during the October terms,
195!1-1962.
1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

Cases remaining
on the dockets
from the previous term
151
160
205
219
!151
225
281
356
385
428
Cases filed
1,302 1,397 1,644 1,802 1,639 1,819 1,862 1,940 2,185 2,373
Cases disposed of 1,293 1,352 1,630 1,670 1,765 1,763 1,787 1,911 2,142 2,327
Cases remaining
on the dockets
at the end of
the term
160
205
219
351
281
225
356
474
385
428
Dnu:croa OF THE .ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE

OF THE

U.S.

COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT

178 (1963).

59. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.l (1963) (Clark, J.,);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (1962) (separate opinion).
60. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., supra note 59, at 175; Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, supra note 59, at 355.
61. ROBERTSON &: KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 37, § 171; see Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, supra note 59, at 357-65 (separate opinion).
62. See Appendix.
63. See Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Negative View, 1961 N.Y. S.B.A.
ANTITRUST L. SYMPOSIUM 94, 96. But see Gesell, A Much Needed Reform-Repeal the
Expediting Act for Antitrust Cases, 1961 N.Y. S.B.A. .ANnnuST L. SYMPOSIUM 98, 100.
64. See Solomon, supra note 63; FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a).
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Court could be directed to narrow questions of law rather than to
untangling the facts and errors from the typically lengthy record of
an antitrust case.65 Certainly a carefully written opinion after a thorough review by the court of appeals could aid the Supreme Court in
determining whether it should even hear the case, especially if the
case relates to antitrust matters of marginal public importance.
In summary, several of the reasons proffered for adopting the
direct appeals provision of the Expediting Act no longer have any
basis. Likewise, not all government civil antitrust cases raise issues
which are of such vital importance that they must be quickly decided by the Supreme Court. But because of the automatic bypass of
the court of appeals, the Supreme Court must decide whether
to hear such cases without the benefit of intermediate appeal and
with the knowledge that the appealing party will be entirely denied
· review if the high court refuses. On the other hand, the act can unquestionably speed up the ultimate determination of important
government cases through the direct appeals provision; also, section
2 offers a valuable tool for avoiding delay in the final adjudication of
cases of general public importance.

B. The Provision for a Discretionary Three-Judge District Court
After 1903, the idea of providing a three-judge district court to
hear cases of general importance enjoyed increasing favor. In 1906
this procedure was extended to suits to restrain, set aside, or annul
an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 66 In 1913 jurisdiction over suits to enjoin orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission was placed in a mandatory three-judge district court under
the Urgent Deficiencies Act. 67 Subsequently, the provision for a
mandatory three-judge district court was made applicable to suits to
enjoin orders of other federal administrative agencies. 68 In 1950,
however, the jurisdiction over suits to enjoin orders of federal administrative agencies other than the Interstate Commerce Commission was vested in the court of appeals. 69 Although other statutes not
dealing with judicial review of orders of federal administrative agencies do still provide for mandatory three-judge district courts,70 the
Expediting Act is the only one which presently calls for the invoca65. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (separate opinion).
66. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, § 5, 34 Stat. 584, 590, 592. See ROBERTSON &:
KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 37, § 213.
67. Ibid.
68. Id. § 214.
69. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, §§ 1-12, 64 Stat. 1129-30, as amended, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1031-42 (1958). See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 30, at 47-48. Jurisdiction
over suits to enjoin orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission is vested in a
three-judge district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1958).
70. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282 (1958).
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tion of a three-judge district court solely at the discretion of the
Attorney General.
It has been suggested that the gradual demise of the three-judge
district courts demonstrates that they were an unsuccessful experiment.71 Moreover, since a three-judge trial court cuts into the time
of three federal judges, there is understandably some antagonism by
the federal judiciary toward its use. Perhaps because of this, section
1 of the Expediting Act has been little used, and its critics claim that
it has been permitted to die a natural death and should be repealed.12 However, it should be noted that when suits to enjoin orders of the federal administrative agencies were taken out of the
hands of three-judge district courts they were not placed in the hands
of a single district court judge; rather, initial jurisdiction was
vested in the court of appeals. In addition, the fact that the Attorney
General has seldom exercised his discretion to invoke a three-judge
district court does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
provision should be repealed. The Justice Department apparently
feels there are occasional antitrust cases which merit a trial before
three judges. For example, in 1952 the Department admitted that in
the prior fifteen years it had invoked the special three-judge district
court only six times.73 However, in each of those six cases, the Department considered it essential to have a three-judge court established to hear the case,74 although the Department generally recognizes the necessity of not unduly hampering the judiciary with
repeated calls upon three judges to hear a case.75
It would seem that the limited use of the three-judge provision
by the Attorney General reflects a proper use of his discretion.16 On
the other hand, during the recent ten-year period of 1954 through
1963 no cases were appealed to the Supreme Court from a three-judge
district court invoked under section 1 of the act. Moreover, the
Department of Justice did not reveal in which six cases the threejudge provision had been invoked, but only that it considered a threejudge court essential to hear each case. Therefore, although perhaps
the factors which originally justified the enactment of the three71. See Gesell, supra note 63, at 100.
72. See 109 CoNc. REc. ll9II (1963) (remarks of Senator Johnston).
73. JUDICIAL CON.FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT 31 (1952).
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid. For another explanation for the Attorney General's hesitation to invoke
the three-judge court, see Gesell, supra note 63, at 100.
76. There is the opportunity, of course, for abuse of discretion. For example, a
three-judge court could be invoked to coerce a single district judge into setting aside
other matters in order to proceed with an antitrust case. See Solomon, supra note
63, at 94. One recent case utilizing a three-judge district court has come to the author's
attention. United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (D. Cal. 1963).
Arguably this case was of general public importance considering the rising national
trend toward bank mergers. However, the case, which was decided against the Government, was not appealed to the Supreme Court.
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judge provision may still be relevant today, unfortunately there is
no definitive disclosed proof of that fact.
Ill.

R.ECE_NT ATTEMPTS To AMEND OR REPEAL
THE EXPEDITING Acr

Since 1949, several attempts have been made to modify, amend,
or repeal various provisions of the Expediting Act. The first bill,77
introduced in the House by Representative Celler, would have
modified section I of the act. It provided that if, after a three-judge
district court had been convened at the discretion of the Attorney
General, the chief judge of the circuit decided that a hearing by a
three-judge court "would unduly prejudice the dispatch of other
judicial business in the circuit" he could reassign the case to a single
district judge. Although this bill would have given the judiciary the
power to deny the Attorney General's request, the Attorney General
expressed his approval of the proposed measure. 78 The Judicial Conference of the United States also recommended that the bill be enacted,79 but it never emerged from Committee. An identical bill was
introduced two years later by Representative Celler; 80 it too was
never reported out of Committee.
Another attempt at amendment occurred in 1961.81 A bill introduced by Representative Toll proposed that a national panel of antitrust judges be appointed from among the district judges by the
Chief Justice of the United States, acting with the advice of the chief
judge of each circuit. When proceedings were brought in the usual
course within any district, either the Attorney General or the judge
before whom the case was pending could certify to the chief judge
of the circuit that the case was of national public importance and
that the proceedings were likely to be protracted. If the chief judge
of the circuit concurred, he would designate a single judge from the
panel to hear the case. This bill was likewise never reported out of
Committee, and it is not clear what the position of the Department
of Justice was on this amendment. However, the Judicial Conference
disapproved the bill on the ground that it would be "inappropriate
for the Chief Justice of the United States to make such an assignment and designation of district judges."82 Nor did the Conference
accept the provision for only one judge to try the case upon the filing
of the certificate by the Attorney General.83
In 1963, a third assault was made on the Expediting Act. This
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

H.R. 6451, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT

13 (1950).

Ibid.
H.R. 3516, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
H.R. 6766, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT
JUDICIAL CONFERE.VCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT

68 (1961).
12 (1962).
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one was an attempt to repeal it entirely for antitrust cases.84 Under
the provisions of S. 1811, government civil antitrust cases were to be
appealed on the same basis as other litigation brought before the
district court. That is, appeals, as well as interlocutory appeals,
would be taken to the court of appeals, with the right to seek review
in the Supreme Court by petition for a ·writ of certiorari. 85 One of
the sponsors of the bill, Senator Johnston, stated while introducing
it on the Senate floor that the bill also provided for direct review by
the Supreme Court of decisions in the district court in "the rare and
important case when such review would be in the public interest." 86
Apparently what Senator Johnston meant by "rare and important"
was such litigation as the Steel Seizure Case, 81 which was appealed
to the Supreme Court. The procedure followed in that case was to
have the circuit court of appeals stay the injunction granted against
the government by the district court, whereupon the Supreme Court
immediately granted certiorari. While the Supreme Court heard
that suit without the benefit of a court of appeals review, the case
was technically not appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Moreover, since cases of such importance occur most infrequently, it
would indeed be rare when the Supreme Court would permit an
appeal to be taken in that manner. The practical effect of that bill
then would have been to eliminate direct review in the Supreme
Court of many cases which are economically significant and have
need of expediting, but are not of such a nature as to threaten the
nation with an economic catastrophe. While it seems improvident to
dump all government civil antitrust appeals in the Supreme Court's
lap directly from the district courts, some antitrust cases do warrant
expedition, 88 and to the extent that the proposal would have eliminated them from consideration, it would seem too harsh.
The fourth bill,89 which was endorsed by the Department of Justice,90 proposed to amend section 2 of the Expediting Act and followed closely on the heels of S. 1811. It would leave the three-judge
provision of section I intact; consequently, if the Attorney General
certified that the case was of general public importance before the
entry of final judgment, then a three-judge court would be convened
to hear the case. Under section 2, if the Attorney General or the
district court, either on its own motion or on the application of a
party, filed an expediting certificate at any time within thirty days
84. S. 1811, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
85. 109 CoNG. RI:c. 11911-12 (1963) (remarks of Senator Johnston).
86. Ibid.
87. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
88. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT 131 (1952); Solomon,
supra note 63. This also seems to have been implied by Mr. Justice Harlan himself in
his Brown Shoe opinion. 370 U.S. at 364 (1962) (separate opinion).
89. S. 1892, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
90. JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT 76 (1963).
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after final judgment, an appeal from the final decision of the single
district court judge would lie directly to the Supreme Court. But so
long as neither the Attorney General nor the district court filed an
expediting certificate, final and interlocutory appeals would lie to
the court of appeals. This bill was not reported out of Committee
and has not as yet been reintroduced in the 89th Congress. The Judicial Conference approved it, but suggested that it be amended to
require the Attorney General to obtain leave of court in order to
certify the case as one of general public importance, 91 thereby subjecting any right of direct appeal from the final decision of a single
district judge to the discretion of the judiciary. As the bill last stood,
however, the district judge had no such discretion.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It seems clear that a number of antitrust cases are appealed directly to the Supreme Court which are not within the intended purview of the Expediting Act. Some issues which come before the
Court involve disputes over procedural matters, while others merely
raise questions of the correctness of findings of fact. These cases
could be adequately reviewed by the court of appeals. On the other
hand, some government civil antitrust cases will continue to raise
questions of importance within the original spirit of the act; and for
these cases a benefit to the public and considerable saving in both
time and money to the parties can be realized by allowing expedition to a final determination. Considering the sparing use that is
made of the three-judge district court provision, it seems reasonable
to conclude that there is no abuse of discretion in its use.
These conclusions do not support an argument for repeal of the
act; however, they do indicate that certain modifications might be
beneficial. The necessary modifications seem adequately expressed
in the last mentioned bill, S. 1892. Under this bill, because there
is no automatic direct appeal to the Supreme Court, many government civil antitrust cases would be appealed through the courts
of appeals, with full benefit of interlocutory appellate procedures.
In those cases which are considered out of the ordinary and deserving of direct review in the Supreme Court because vital issues which
may affect the nation's economy are involved, expedition procedure
will be available.
The advisability of incorporating the amendment to S. 1892 suggested by the Judicial Conference is questionable. That amendment
would vest absolute discretion for expedition in the hands of a single
district judge, some of whom have seen few antitrust cases. Presumably the Attorney General's selection of cases to be brought is in the
public interest, and he is arguably in a better position to evaluate
91. Ibid.
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which will raise novel issues as opposed to merely routine enforcement matters. However, for reasons not completely altruistic, the
Justice Department on some occasions may feel it desirable to slow
down the ultimate determination of a case. The provision in S. 1892
permitting the district court either on its own motion or on the application of a party likewise to file an expediting certificate should
counter-balance this potential advantage of the Justice Department.

Robert C. Bonges

APPENDIX
The following table shows the time intervals from the decision of the district court to the decision on appeal in the antitrust cases heardl and
decided in the Supreme Court during the calendar years 1954-1963.
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v. United States
United States v. Loew's, Inc.
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide 8::
Carbon Corp.
United States v. Borden Co.
United States v. Wise
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler 8:: Smith
Citrus Prod. Co.
United States v. Diebold, Inc.
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
FTC v. Henry Broch 8:: Co.

;;:s-.

....
(';;!

~

371 U.S. 94
371 U.S. 38
370
370
370
370

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

690
460
405
294

370
369
368
368

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

19
654
464
360

X
X

17
23
X

X

N.A.4
16
12
31

xa

X
X

X
X

17
X

15

N.A.
14
32
N.A.

~

1..,.
01

;.:.

t:
0

APPENDIX (Continued)

':;>'

Length in months
Type of case

Case

Government
CrimCivil Private F. T. C. inal

Citation

District
Court2
to
Court
ofAppeals

Court
of Ap· District
peals Court
to Su- to Supreme preme
Court Court

1961

United States v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours
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Tampa Elcc. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.
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Guerlain, Inc. v. United States
United States v. National Malleable&:
Steel Casting Co.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States
Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC
FTC v. Standard Oil Co.
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vance
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co.
Nationwide Trailer Rental Sys., Inc. v.
United States
New Orleans Ins. Exch. v. United States
United States v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours &: Co.
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp.
Radovich v. National Football League
FTC v. National Lead Co.
FTC v. American Crayon Co.
United Liquors Corp. v. United States
Holophane Co., Inc. v. United States
United States v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours &: Co.
United States v. McKesson &: Robbins, Inc.
United States v. International Boxing Club
United States v. Shubert
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Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.
United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States
United States v. Borden Co.
United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'nli
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount
Film Distrib. Corp.
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4
1. This table includes within the antitrust cases which were appealed under the Expediting Act those cases in which the Supreme Court's deci-

sion merely consisted of sustaining a motion to affirm the trial court's decision. However, cases appealed under the Expediting Act which raised
only questions of federal procedure were not included. E.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961) (time interval from
district court to Supreme Court was 18 months); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (time interval from district court to
Supreme Court was 21 months). With regard to non-Expediting Act cases, the table does not include those in which the Supreme Court merely denied an application for a writ of certiorari, nor does it include cases raising only questions of federal procedure. E.g., Goldlawr, Inc, v. Heiman,
369 U.S. 463 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
2. Or the Federal Trade Commission where appropriate.
3. This case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1958),
4. The date of the district court's decision was not available. Consequently, it was impossible to determine the length of time required to
appeal the case.
5. This case was tried and appealed together with United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954). For purposes of tabulation
they are treated as one case.
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